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ment in the press and some debate on the floor of the Senate. This is a most serious matter which involves the constitutional responsibility of the Senate of the United States. When the Senate is called upon to make a decision in this matter, it should be permitted to act on the merits and substance of the issue. I am hopeful the issue will not be obscured by irrelevant arguments.

Although the Central Intelligence Agency has rarely been the subject of legislation and of congressional comment infrequently over the years, much attention and discussion has been devoted to the problem of congressional supervision of that Agency. This concern was reflected in the 1955 Hoover Commission recommendation that "the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy." The concern was further reflected in the debate in the Senate in 1956 on the resolution offered by the present majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD]. The present proposal is much more modest than that recommended by the Hoover Commission. It relates only to the Senate. I would provide for a nine-member committee composed of three members each from the Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations Committees, and it would be empowered to keep itself informed of activities in the field of foreign intelligence operations. The practical effect of the resolution would be to add three members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the present CIA oversight subcommittee. Its effect would be to authorize the Central Intelligence Agency to provide to three members of the Committee on Foreign Relations information it now provides to selected members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and to the nine members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

What is at stake is nothing less than the constitutional responsibility of the Senate to advise and consent to the foreign relations of the United States. In the Senate the burden of this responsibility is assigned to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The Standing Rules of the Senate list, among other areas of jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "relations of the United States with foreign nations generally" and "interventions abroad and declarations of war." Leaving aside the matter of interventions abroad, in which one would certainly have to include the Bay of Pigs, the responsibility of the committee for the "relations of the United States with foreign nations generally" makes it clear that the Committee on Foreign Relations does have at least partial responsibility for the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies which operate more or less exclusively in the foreign relations area. Its jurisdiction appears, from a reading of the rules of the Senate, much clearer in this matter than that of the Armed Services Committee, whose jurisdiction under the rules would not appear to extend to areas where the foreign relations of the United States are concerned.

jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee derives—and this is apparently the case made by its distinguished chairman—from the precedent of the Senate that legislative oversight of a Government agency is traditionally vested in the committee which reported the bill by which the agency was created.

AID—BEFORE FINANCE—OTHER AGENCIES

In this connection the chairman of the Armed Services Committee has suggested that if the Foreign Relations Committee can claim representation on the CIA oversight committee, then the Armed Services Committee should have representation on the Foreign Relations Committee. I would certainly have no objection to that if it could be demonstrated that the Secretary of State refused to make available to the Armed Services Committee information he was willing to make available to the Foreign Relations Committee. As Senators are aware, the Director of the Central Intelligence has advised the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations that he is unwilling to make available to members of that committee information that is made available to selected members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and to the President's Advisory Board.

The issue then turns on whether or not the Central Intelligence Agency does, in fact, carry out actions which affect the foreign relations of the United States. It is my judgment that it does, and that, further, its role in this area has increased over the years and is still increasing. It is not relevant to contend that the CIA is not authorized to make foreign policy. Of course, it is not so authorized. The foreign policy of the United States is "made" by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate and, to a lesser extent, of the whole Congress. But I believe it is difficult to argue against the conclusion that the CIA has in the past and does by its present actions continue to create situations to which policy must be adjusted. In such cases, whether it is "making" policy or merely "influencing" policy is largely a question of semantics.

This aspect of its activities, as opposed to its purely intelligence-gathering role, has been called by some an expansion of its original mandate. In 1963, former President Harry S. Truman wrote:

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our difficulties in several explosive areas.

I never had any thought that when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue—and a subject for cold war enemy propaganda.

Public debate on this important matter has unfortunately been hampered by

PROPOSED COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, on Thursday of this week the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations intends to report to the Senate a committee resolution proposing the creation of a Senate Committee in Intelligence Operations.

Over the past several months, the question of the proper exercise of the Senate's responsibility for foreign intelligence operations, and particularly of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been the subject of considerable com-

First, some have suggested that if we pass this resolution, we would be implying that the present committee and its chairman have been derelict in their duty. This is not at all the opinion of members of the Foreign Relations Committee. The Senator from Georgia has served this body ably, with distinction and dedication for many years. He serves it today as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, as a ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations, and as chairman of the Joint CIA Subcommittee of those two standing committees. He served it as a member of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. He also serves as a member of the Democratic Policy Committee and of the Democratic Steering Committee. He was also a member of the Warren Commission which investigated the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. President, I suggest rather that it is the Foreign Relations Committee which would be guilty of dereliction if it did not seek to provide itself with the information which it requires to fulfill its constitutional responsibility. Rather than making a claim to be included, we are attempting to resist exclusion from an area in which we have a right to knowledge. The committee is not muscling in.

Second, it has been suggested that individuals who serve as sources of information for the CIA would be compromised or even their lives threatened if members of the Foreign Relations Committee were permitted to exercise their responsibility. It has even been suggested that the very discussion of the CIA on the floor of the Senate may imperil lives—one presumably excepts those instances where Senators have risen to defend the CIA. I believe there is no substance to these charges. For the Foreign Relations Committee to fulfill its responsibility, it is not necessary, in my judgment, for it to know the identity of the individuals who may serve the CIA as sources. Our proper concern is policy, and the actions which can have a determining effect on that policy.

Third, it has been implied that some Members of the Senate cannot be trusted with information which involves the national security of the United States.

All members of the Senate appreciate the distinction between information relating to the national security and the kind of information which in one way involves the national security. I believe it serves no useful purpose to debate whether one committee or another, or one side of the aisle or the other, is more frequently the source of leaks. But I do not know of a single instance in which a member has divulged information affecting the national security which was made available to him in the Foreign Relations Committee.

If it is the judgment of the Senate that the present membership of the Foreign Relations Committee is unreliable, then consideration should be given to changing its membership. The important thing is that the Foreign Rela-

tions Committee be in a position to meet its responsibilities.

Fourth, some have stated that the number of persons with access to information about the Central Intelligence Agency ought to be quite limited. I would agree with that. I cannot agree that the addition of three members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the present subcommittee would inordinately increase the number. Rather, the contrary may well be the case; for if the Senate fails to act on this resolution, if it fails to establish a formal structure for oversight of the CIA, the present arrangement, whose informal nature permits considerable expansion beyond nine will be continued.

Let us examine the present situation. In the Senate, the CIA Subcommittee has a potential membership of nine—five from Armed Services and four from Appropriations—although at present only seven Senators are actually serving because of overlapping membership on the two committees. In the House, oversight of the CIA is exercised by a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee under the chairmanship of Congressman L. MENDEL RIVERS; this subcommittee is composed of the 11 ranking members of the Armed Services Committee including, in addition to the chairman [Mr. RIVERS], Congressmen PHILBIN, HEBERT, PRICE, FISHER, HARDY, BENNETT, BATES, ARENDS, O'KONSKI, and BRAY. Oversight of the CIA is also exercised by the House Appropriations Committee, which has always declined to state publicly: One, who the members are who perform this function; two, how many members are involved; three, how they are selected; four, whether a subcommittee exists to perform this function. We just do not know how many House Members are involved. We do know, however, that the nine members of the President's Advisory Board are included among those who receive full information and also that a number of members of the Bureau of the Budget are informed as to CIA activities.

Mr. President, one may surely assume that nine responsible Members of the Senate of the United States will guard at least as carefully as an undetermined number of Members of the House, nine members of the President's Advisory Board, or any one of the thousands of members of the executive branch, information affecting the national security of the United States and the lives of its citizens.

Finally, it has been suggested that there is no need for members of the Foreign Relations Committee to receive CIA information because there is a new Director. But those in favor of the Foreign Relations Committee's playing a role have never suggested that the person of the Director had any relation to the problem. Actually it is irrelevant, for this problem of the CIA's foreign policy role has developed over the years, under a series of Directors.

It is my judgment that to permit the Foreign Relations Committee to share this responsibility would strengthen the CIA and help protect it from some of the

charges that are made; for by acting to formalize the oversight structure, the whole Senate would be meeting its responsibility more effectively. This in turn would lead to increased public confidence that the CIA is being adequately controlled, a confidence that to some extent now appears lacking.